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Abstract 
In this study, we examine the question of how the adoption of IT systems influences revenue 
management in hospitals. We posit that IT plays a vital role in enhancing revenue by increasing net 
patient revenue and decreasing the uncompensated care ratio. Using unique datasets from various 
proprietary resources, we test the relationships between IT (clinical and business) investment and 
revenue management performance using dynamic panel data models with the generalized method of 
moments (GMM). Empirical results generally support our hypotheses. We found that both clinical 
and business IT investment have short-term and long-term effects on boosting net patient revenue 
and that clinical IT investment has a short-term contemporaneous effect on reducing the 
uncompensated care ratio. Moderation analyses suggest that: (1) larger hospitals tend to utilize 
business IT systems better in facilitating revenue management through both channels over the long 
run, but not necessarily using clinical IT; and (2) for-profit hospitals outperform their nonprofit 
counterparts when it comes to managing revenues through clinical IT; however, no interaction effect 
with business IT was found. This paper contributes to the literatures on the business value of IT 
investment and healthcare IT in the fields of information systems, revenue management, healthcare 
administration. We conclude this paper by discussing theoretical and managerial implications. 
Keywords: IT, Hospital, Clinical, Business, Revenue Management, Patient Revenue, 
Uncompensated Care, Nonprofit, For-Profit, HIMSS, OSHPD 
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1 Introduction 
The information technology (IT) and healthcare 
literatures have clearly documented that IT can 
enhance operational and financial performance (Barua 
& Mukhopadhyay, 2000; Setia et al., 2011; Tanriverdi, 
2006). For healthcare organizations, IT has long been 
viewed as an important lever to improve financial and 
operational viability. According to a McKinsey & 
Company report by Laflamme, Pietraszek, and 
Rajadhyax (2010), US hospitals will spend 
approximately $120 billion, at an average cost of 
$80,000 to $100,000 per bed, on IT in the upcoming 
years, highlighting the significance of these 
investments for the health care industry. Investments 
in IT, for example, can increase hospital productivity 
(Menon, Lee, & Eldenburg, 2000), reduce operating 
costs (Glaser, Drazen, & Cohen, 1986; Hillestad et al., 
2005), increase quality of care (Chaudhry et al., 2006; 
McCullough, Casey, Moscovice, & Prasad, 2010) and 
reduce information asymmetries between consumers 
and providers through improved voluntary disclosures 
(Angst et al., 2014). More recent studies examine the 
role of IT on other aspects of the healthcare quality and 
hospital performance, including the studies by 
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Yaraghwe (2015) and Eftekhari et al. (2017) on the 
effect of health information exchanges on reducing 
repetitive medical tests and services and a study that 
investigates the spillover effects of health IT 
investments on regional healthcare costs (Atasoy, 
Chen, & Ganju, 2017). 
While considerable research has examined the effect of 
IT in healthcare organizations, the focus has been on 
operating cost, quality, and quantity. The impact of IT 
on the revenue side of the performance equation has 
been understudied. Just as firms manage costs, whether 
through actual productivity gains or by strategically 
managing reported cost via real earnings management 
(Eldenburg et al., 2011), research also acknowledges 
that firms manage revenues. Considerable extant 
literature has explored mechanisms through which 
organizations manage their revenues (McGill & van 
Ryzin, 1999; Talluri & van Ryzin, 2005). In extreme 
cases, firms might also engage in improper activities 
such as recognizing fictitious revenues, overbilling, 
kickbacks, or channel stuffing to manage their 
revenues (Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010; Stubben, 
2010). While firms operating in other industries can 
simply drop unprofitable product lines or strategically 
allocate resources to high-margin items, this flexibility 
is not available in the hospital industry because of two 
factors: health care regulation and the predominantly 
nonprofit structure of the industry. Health care in the 
US is subject to a complex and oftentimes bewildering 
array of regulations that largely shape organizations’ 
choices with respect to managing their costs and 
revenues. On the cost side, hospitals face multiple 
demands to provide costly services that are either not 
reimbursed (such as care for the indigent population) 
or underreimbursed (e.g., some services provided to 
fee-regulated patients such as Medicaid patients). 
Recent data from the American Hospital Association’s 
(AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals shows that US 
hospitals provided $38.3 billion in uncompensated 
care in 2016, up from $35.7 billion in 2015, which does 
not even include underpayment from Medicare or 
Medicaid.
1
 On the revenue side, hospitals’ pricing 
options are largely regulated. For instance, most 
patients admitted to a hospital are covered by insurance 
plans that either reimburse hospitals based on a flat rate 
per diagnosis (e.g., Medicare or Medicaid programs) 
or a fee-capped scheme (e.g. HMOs or PPOs). 
Therefore, hospitals have limited flexibility in 
influencing revenues through increased mark-up or 
premium pricing. In addition, public insurance 
programs such as Medicare and Medicaid are, 
respectively, federally funded or state supported. 
Within Medicare, which is reimbursed on a flat-fee, 
there are some portions that are traditional indemnity-
 
1 “Hospital Uncompensated Care Costs Climb in 2016” 
(https://www.aha.org/news/headline/2018-01-04-hospital-
uncompensated-care-costs-climb-2016). 
based plans and others that are managed-care-based 
plans. Medicaid reimbursement rates are not only 
lower than Medicare rates (about 66% of Medicare 
rates for the US) but are subject to the vagaries of state 
budgets, priorities, and politics. Further, while for-
profit hospitals can turn nonemergency patients away, 
nonprofit hospitals are not allowed to turn away 
patients, regardless of their insurance status. The US 
hospital industry is primarily comprised of nonprofit 
hospitals, which have a market share of 87% of the 
total community hospital beds (cdc.gov). This situation 
poses a quandary to hospitals—on the one hand, they 
seek to maximize a multidimensional objective 
function that includes providing unprofitable services, 
subject to a breakeven profit constraint in the case of 
nonprofits, or a profit constraint in the case of for-
profits. On the other hand, these unprofitable services 
must be either self-sustaining or supported by 
transitory revenue sources such as donations and 
subsidies.  
Revenue management provides a powerful tool for 
hospitals to continue providing unprofitable services, 
consistent with their objective function. Since 
researchers have found that IT can enhance multiple 
aspects of hospital performance, we are also interested 
in exploring the role of IT systems in hospitals’ 
revenue management, which will contribute to the 
information systems and healthcare administration 
literatures. By “revenue management,” we imply both 
enhancing revenue generation and improving the 
efficiency of the revenue cycle to reduce the amount of 
uncompensated care. We argue that, overall, IT (both 
clinical and business) systems can improve the 
efficiency of clinical and nonclinical processes in 
hospitals and therefore help them manage 
uncompensated care issues. Also, we suggest that it 
takes time for IT adoptions to be completely 
assimilated and IT systems to be fully understood and 
utilized by physicians, nurses, and administrators in 
hospitals. Therefore, IT investments have long-term 
effects in addition to their short-term effects. Finally, 
we explore the heterogeneous effects of IT on revenue 
management performance across different hospital 
types because hospitals with different missions might 
not equally value revenue management and may use IT 
in different ways. 
We combine two unique secondary data sources on 
hospitals’ IT adoption and financial information and 
conduct empirical analyses to examine the 
relationships between clinical and business IT 
investments and two aspects of revenue management. 
Our empirical results can be summarized as follows. 
First, found that both clinical and business IT 
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investment have positive short-term and long-term 
effects on enhancing net patient revenue. In other 
words, investment in both types of IT systems helps 
bring in more revenue both in the same year and within 
several years of adoption. Second, clinical IT 
investment was found to have a short-term effect on 
reducing the uncompensated care ratio. Even though 
we did not find the effect of business IT on the 
reduction of uncompensated care rate in our main 
analyses, we found that larger hospitals tend to utilize 
business IT systems better in facilitating revenue 
management through this channel over the long run, 
partly because of the fact that larger organizations have 
better resources to support and complement IT 
adoptions. Additional moderation analyses further 
suggest that nonprofit hospitals, compared to their for-
profit counterparts, do not perform as well when it 
comes to managing revenues with the help of clinical 
IT, probably because of the lack of incentives to 
maximize revenue and minimize bad debt. However, 
we found no interaction effect between nonprofit status 
and business IT investment.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
discusses the theoretical background of our study, 
including the role of IT in organization performance 
and the significance of revenue management, and 
provides a review of prior studies in these fields. In 
Section 3, we develop hypotheses on the effect of IT 
on two revenue management measures and their 
moderating effects according to hospital size and type. 
Section 4 presents our methodology description, 
including an explanation of variables and econometric 
specifications. In Section 5, we present the empirical 
results on those hypothesized relationships. Section 6 
summarizes and concludes the paper by discussing 
both academic contributions and managerial 
implications. 
2 Theoretical Background 
2.1 IT and Organizational Performance 
The literature on IT and organizational performance is 
rich with both theoretical conceptualization and 
empirical testing. Bharadwaj (2000) and Melville, 
Kraemer, and Gurbaxani (2004) use the resource-
based view to explain why IT creates value for 
organizations. Sambamurthy, Bharadwaj, and 
Grover’s (2003) conceptualization of the role of IT in 
contemporary firms discusses how digital options 
shape organizational agility. Empirically, earlier work 
in the field of information systems, such as Weill’s 
study (1992), investigates the impact of IT investment 
in the manufacturing sector and Bharadwaj, 
Bharadwaj, and Konsynski (1999) provide evidence 
supporting the relationship between IT investment and 
firm performance measured using Tobin’s q. Ray, 
Muhanna, and Barney (2005) look at the firm 
performance in terms of customer service, and Rai, 
Patnayakuni, and Seth (2006) examine the firm 
performance impacts of digitally enabled supply chain 
systems. More recent work, such as Tambe & Hitt’s 
studies (2012, 2013), provide further evidence using 
alternative measures of IT and firm performance. 
These studies indicate that the performance impacts of 
IT applications vary across different categories of 
applications (Setia et al., 2011). In the health IT 
literature, Barua and Mukhopadhyay (2000), 
Tanriverdi (2006), and Setia et al. (2011) examine the 
performance implication of IT in the healthcare sector. 
While most prior work focuses on cost and quality, this 
study contributes to the literature by examining the 
effect of IT on hospitals’ revenue enhancement 
performance and the underlying mechanisms of bad-
debt management.  
Like many researchers in previous studies, we use the 
resource-based view as the theoretical foundation to 
explain why IT creates value for hospitals. The 
resource-based view posits that firms differ in their 
possession of resources, some of which are rare, 
inimitable, and tied semipermanently to the firm; if 
used effectively, the resource-based view suggests that 
this resource asymmetry can serve as a source of 
sustained competitive advantage (Amit & 
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991, 2001). The 
resource-based view considers a broader set of 
resources, capabilities, and competencies, including 
in-house knowledge, technical capabilities, and 
management skills (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; 
Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984). IT is one of those 
resources and is valuable for organizations if it is rare, 
unique, and imitable. Adopting IT systems creates 
competitive advantages for businesses, especially for 
early adopters. IT systems adopted by general 
businesses can be further categorized according to 
several types, such as data processing, e-commerce, 
telecommunication, and decision support, among 
others. Prior research has predominantly focused on 
the impact of adoption and use of a certain technology 
or the dollar amount of investments on IT; while such 
studies are valuable, a focus on the entire portfolio of 
IT provides a more nuanced view (Mendelson, 2000; 
Setia et al., 2011). Whereas Setia et al. (2011) offer 
constructs of IT-application architecture spread and IT 
application architecture longevity, we create similar 
portfolio-based variables to measure IT adoption. In 
making IT investment decisions, hospitals face 
numerous challenges. First, there is a plethora of health 
information technologies and hospitals must assess 
which of these technologies are appropriate for their 
specific needs. Hospital IT systems can be classified 
into two broad categories: (1) business IT systems such 
as patient billing, credit and collection systems, and 
scheduling systems that help enhance revenues and 
effectively utilize capacity (Elkhuizen et al., 2007), 
and (2) clinical IT systems such as cardiology 
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information systems, pharmacy management systems, 
and laboratory IS that are used to assist medical 
providers in patient treatment and improve health 
outcomes (Robinson & Luft, 1988). In this paper, we 
explore the depth of both business and clinical IT 
systems.  
2.2 Revenue Management 
In the non-healthcare context, previous studies have 
documented various mechanisms through which 
organizations strategically manage their revenues, 
such as pricing, product mix, customer mix, markets 
coverage, and market segmentation decisions (McGill 
& Van Ryzin, 1999; Talluri & Van Ryzin, 2005). For 
example, McGill and Van Ryzin (1999) discuss 
revenue management practices in the airline industry 
including forecasting, overbooking, seat inventory 
control, and pricing in relation to their impacts on 
airlines’ revenue enhancement. In a more 
comprehensive tutorial in operations research, Talluri 
and Van Ryzin (2005) introduce the concept of 
revenue management and describe it as a mainstream 
business practice with a growing list of industry users, 
ranging from airlines, hotels, and resorts to car rental 
companies. “The economic impact of revenue 
management is significant, with increases in revenue 
of 5% or more reported in several industry applications 
of revenue management systems” (Talluri & Van 
Ryzin, 2005, p. 142). This work also provides a 
conceptual framework that explains why and how 
businesses manage revenues, given customer 
heterogeneity, demand variability, production 
inflexibility, data and information infrastructure, and 
management culture. Talluri and Van Ryzin (2005) 
also suggest that, historically, retailing, energy, 
airlines, and manufacturing are among the sectors in 
which revenue management is most necessary. They 
discuss how firms use IT systems such as point-of-sale, 
enterprise resource planning, supply chain 
management, and customer relationship management 
to facilitate revenue management. As discussed above, 
revenue management is essential to healthcare. 
Furthermore, given high levels of regulation in 
hospitals and limitations on how much revenue 
healthcare providers can generate, we would expect 
specialized health IT systems to facilitate hospital 
revenue management. 
In this paper, we examine revenue management 
performance through two metrics: increase of net 
patient revenue and reduction of uncompensated care. 
We refer to these two measures in the following section 
in which we develop our hypotheses. 
3 Hypotheses Development 
3.1 IT and Net Patient Revenue 
Following the previous literature, we first examine the 
effect of IT on net patient revenue (NPR) as the first 
dependent variable. NPR is simply the outcome 
measure of a hospital’s revenue management 
performance. Devaraj and Kohli (2000, 2003) use NPR 
as a main dependent variable of hospital performance. 
Devaraj, Ow, and Kohli (2013) suggest that 
performance measures must consider hospital-wide 
criteria as opposed to unit-level functional criteria, 
which can result in suboptimization (Roth & van 
Dierdonck, 1995). Alternative measures such as cost 
and profitability, even though commonly used, are 
affected by the terms of contracts with insurance 
companies, while NPR is more meaningful for 
hospitals because it is a consistent measure of the 
extent of services a hospital provides and is unaffected 
by discounted reimbursement or by the local 
competitive environment. In their study, Devaraj, Ow, 
and Kohli (2013) examine the impact of IT investment 
on the swiftness and evenness of patient flow and 
subsequently on hospital performance (measured by 
NPR) and find positive relationships—namely, IT 
investment in hospitals can lead to improved 
performance from the two channels of effectiveness 
and efficiency. Effectiveness relates to doing things in 
a way that leads to expected or desired outcomes 
(Devaraj, Ow, & Kohli, 2013), and efficiency refers to 
the ability to produce higher output (i.e., see more 
patients) for a given set of inputs. We argue that 
clinical IT systems contribute meaningfully to the 
effectiveness part of performance because they can 
help medical providers improve diagnoses and 
treatment, whereas business IT systems focus more on 
the efficiency side of the business. Since this study is 
on revenue management, it will be helpful to first 
examine whether IT impacts the ultimate outcome of 
revenue at all before investigating the underlying 
mechanism. Overall, we argue that IT investment 
makes patient care more effective and efficient, thus 
helping to bring in more revenue. We first examine the 
short-term contemporaneous effect and argue that IT 
investment has instantaneous effects. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H1a: Clinical IT (CIT) has positive short-term effects 
on net patient revenue. 
H1b: Business IT (BIT) has positive short-term effects 
on net patient revenue. 
Research has also noted that there are 
complementarities between IT and organizational 
processes (Barua & Mukhopadhyay, 2000; Pavlou & 
El Sawy, 2006). Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2003) discuss 
how important organizational transformation is for 
successful IT adoption. Kalakota and Robinson (2003) 
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also suggest that complementarities facilitate the 
seamless integration of IT and business processes or 
“activity systems” such as customer relationships, 
operations, financial, and human resource 
management. Prior research on IT in a non-healthcare 
context suggests that organizations often require time 
to learn and adapt to IT systems and that organizations 
incur time lags before expected returns manifest 
(Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2003; Curley & Pyburn, 1982). 
In the hospital setting, Devaraj and Kohli (2003) find 
that even though technology usage was positively and 
significantly associated with measures of hospital 
revenue and quality, this effect occurred only after 
time lags, suggesting that complementarities between 
IT adoption and organizational transformation or 
process redesign are vital to the success of technology 
adoption. Therefore, investments in IT might not pay 
off instantaneously because organizational process 
adaptation and organizational learning must first 
occur. Indeed, in its initial phases, IT adoption may 
appear to make the organization less efficient. Markus 
and Tanis (2000) map out the process of implementing 
enterprise IT systems and highlight the notion that 
things get worse before they get better. In the 
healthcare sector, Sidorov (2006) notes the high cost of 
adoption and cites evidence that EMR leads to greater 
health spending and reduced provider productivity 
(Dranove et al., 2014). Therefore, the question of how 
IT relates, if at all, to revenue management is not only 
one of effect, but is also likely a question of timing. As 
a result, this study will also address the following 
research question: If IT does facilitate revenue 
management in hospitals, how long it will take it to 
manifest? 
Based on complementarity theory, we anticipate 
lagged effects of up to three years because IT systems 
are usually complex, and physicians other end users 
need time to learn and develop expertise (Dranove, 
1988; Dranove et al., 2014). That is, IT adoption may 
not be able to provide value for the hospitals 
immediately following the adoption; rather, value 
begins to appear only after physicians, nurses, and 
administrators acquire sufficient familiarity and 
expertise in working with the system. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H2a: CIT has positive long-term effects on net patient 
revenue. 
H2b: BIT has positive long-term effects on net patient 
revenue. 
3.2 IT and Uncompensated Care 
Many of the characteristics described by Talluri and 
Van Ryzin (2005) are also present in the healthcare 
sector. Patients are heterogeneous in terms of 
conditions and willingness (ability) to pay. However, 
unlike other industries, where businesses can price 
discriminate and refuse to serve certain customers, 
how much a hospital can charge is usually subject to 
regulations and constrained by fee cap. Also, hospitals 
often cannot turn away patients because of their 
condition or ability to pay. Therefore, uncompensated 
care is a bane of hospitals. Uncompensated care 
typically refers to the sum of a hospital’s unreimbursed 
care expenses incurred, for example, by the inability of 
patients to pay their bills, faulty insurance documents, 
obsolete patient information, or patients’ 
unwillingness to pay for their care. Because hospitals 
cannot turn away patients that are critically ill, they are 
often reconciled to accepting that a proportion of 
expenses will not be reimbursed. Uncompensated care 
costs are nontrivial for most hospitals. In 2013, US 
hospitals claimed $46.4 billion in uncompensated care, 
representing 5.9% of their total costs (AHA, 2015). 
Hospitals often lump charity care and uncompensated 
care expenses together into one category. To the extent 
that a hospital can distinguish between charity care and 
bad debts, it can identify mechanisms to reduce the 
bad-debt portion of uncompensated care by improving 
collection techniques or decreasing care costs. We 
argue that IT systems can offer hospitals the capability 
to lower uncompensated care expenses through 
mechanisms such as improved patient information, 
more accurate insurance verification and record 
keeping, outsourcing receivables management, and 
designing better payment mechanisms. IT can lower 
the cost of the bad-debt portion of uncompensated care 
and help hospitals locate additional mechanisms for 
covering uncompensated care. Also, if a hospital 
adopts advanced clinical IT systems, it could increase 
efficiency in care delivery by preventing unnecessary 
or repetitive diagnoses, checks, and medications. 
Moreover, even when bad debt occurs, having the right 
business IT systems in place could help hospitals 
collect unpaid amounts from patients or locate third-
party resources or subsidies to help cover such costs. 
As mentioned above, we first explore the 
contemporaneous effect of IT on the uncompensated 
care ratio. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H3a: CIT has negative short-term effects on the 
uncompensated care ratio. 
H3b: BIT has negative short-term effects on the 
uncompensated care ratio. 
Using the same rationale, since it takes a long time for 
stakeholders to learn and hospitals to adapt to 
technological adoption with business process 
reengineering, we speculate that investment in IT 
might take years to be effective. Therefore, we 
hypothesize that: 
H4a: CIT has negative long-term effects on the 
uncompensated care ratio. 
H4b: BIT has negative long-term effects on the 
uncompensated care ratio. 
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3.3 Moderating Effects of Hospital Size 
and Type 
We are also interested in exploring the heterogeneous 
effects of IT on revenue management across hospital 
characteristics as IT may not be equally helpful and 
valuable for all hospitals. Hospital size is one factor 
that might moderate hypothesized relationships 
between IT and revenue management performance. 
The same IT system might not be as useful and helpful 
for revenue management for small hospitals as it is for 
larger ones. For larger hospitals, because of their 
resources, once on track, they might outperform their 
small counterparts, as many of those IT systems are 
specifically designed for and thus more valuable to 
large organizations. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H5a: Hospital size interacts with CIT to predict long-
term revenue management performance such 
that the positive long-term effects of CIT on net 
patient revenue and the negative long-term 
effects of CIT on the uncompensated care ratio 
are stronger for larger hospitals. 
H5b: Hospital size interacts with BIT to predict long-
term revenue management performance such 
that the positive long-term effects of BIT on net 
patient revenue and the negative long-term 
effects of BIT on the uncompensated care ratio 
are stronger for larger hospitals. 
Another important hospital characteristic is its 
institutional background or mission. US hospitals can 
be broadly classified as nonprofit and for-profit 
hospitals, with different missions, respectively. Prior 
literature suggests that the objective functions of 
nonprofit hospitals are not merely focused on profit 
maximization but rather include provisions for 
appropriate levels of quality, quantity, and access to a 
range of services (Dranove, 1988; Eldenburg et al., 
2011; Hoerger, 1991; Krishnan, Joshi, & Krishnan, 
2004; Leone & Van Horn, 2005; Newhouse, 1970; 
Pauly & Redisch, 1973). The revenue management 
model of nonprofit hospitals thus differs accordingly. 
The IRS allows tax exemptions for nonprofit hospitals 
that provide so-called “community benefits” including 
charity care (uncompensated), medical education, 
subsidized health services, community health 
improvement activities, etc. 2  Therefore, nonprofit 
hospitals must also focus on ensuring nonfinancial 
outcomes, such as provision of care for indigent 
patients, medical education, and provision of services 
for the community (Frank & Salkever, 1994), and seek 
to provide such services even if they are unprofitable. 
Economists have studied the systematic difference in 
behavior regarding loss between nonprofit and for-
profit hospitals. Dranove, Garthwaite, & Ody (2017) 
 
2 “How Much Charity Care Do Not-For-Profit Hospitals 
Provide?” 
have examined how nonprofit hospitals responded to 
the sharp reductions in their assets caused by the 2008 
stock market collapse and found that the average 
hospital neither raised prices nor reduced treatment 
costs. Part of the reason for this could be related to their 
nonprofit status and associated revenue model, i.e., 
they might be entitled to more charity donations or 
subsidies from government agencies or other social 
groups or tax benefits if they experience financial 
hardship and provide high levels of uncompensated 
care. Therefore, nonprofit hospitals may be less 
motivated than their for-profit counterparts to use IT to 
minimize the amount of uncompensated care provided. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H6a: Hospital type (nonprofit vs. for-profit) interacts 
with CIT to predict revenue management 
performance such that the positive long-term 
effects of CIT on net patient revenue and the 
negative long-term effects of CIT on the 
uncompensated care ratio are weaker for 
nonprofit hospitals. 
H6b: Hospital type (nonprofit vs. for-profit) interacts 
with BIT to predict revenue management 
performance such that the positive long-term 
effects of BIT on net patient revenue and the 
negative long-term effects of BIT on the 
uncompensated care ratio are weaker for 
nonprofit hospitals. 
4 Methodology 
4.1 Overview 
Our empirical analyses use data from two sources: the 
Healthcare Information and Management Systems 
Society (HIMSS) Analytics database and hospital-
level data from the Office of Statewide Health 
Planning and Development (OSHPD) of California. 
Because of data availability limitations, we restrict our 
analyses to hospitals located in the state of California. 
Being in the same state also controls for variations in 
the regulatory environment of the state in which the 
hospital is located. The HIMSS dataset reports the 
status and implementation history of health IT for more 
than 5,300 healthcare providers nationwide (Li, 2014). 
HIMSS classifies IT applications into several 
categories. We label these applications as either 
clinical or business IT based on their purpose or use. 
Hospital and patient-level financial and nonfinancial 
data are reported by the OSHPD annually. We exclude 
specialty hospitals since these hospitals operate 
substantially differently and are not subject to the same 
regulations (Eldenburg et al., 2011). 
(http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20170424/blog/
170429935) 
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4.2 Variable Definitions 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
IT measures are from the HIMSS database between 
2002 and 2012. We examined the depth of both clinical 
and business IT applications. Depth refers to the count 
of live and operational clinical IT applications in a 
hospital in a given year. There are subcategories of IT 
systems for both clinical and business categories. After 
obtaining the summary statistics on the number of IT 
applications adopted in each subcategory, we derived 
a more relevant set of subcategories, presented in 
Table 1, that we used to calculate clinical and business 
IT depth, respectively—since some subcategories are 
rarely adopted, their inclusion in the calculation of 
overall IT depth can thus lead to estimation biases. 
Finally, we calculated the normalized clinical and 
business IT depth by dividing the raw number of IT 
systems adopted in a respective category in a given 
year by the maximum number of IT systems adopted 
by a hospital in a given year. Since the maximum 
number of clinical IT systems adopted by a hospital in 
a single year is 51, that hospital’s normalized clinical 
IT depth is 1 and all other hospitals are given a 
normalized clinical IT depth score that is calculated by 
dividing the hospital’s raw value by this max value, 
yielding results ranging from 0 to 1. Normalized 
business-IT depth measured is similarly constructed. 
This transformation gives us the ability to show the 
impact of IT investment relative to competitors and 
increases the magnitude of the estimation coefficients 
in the regressions, which makes the results more 
interpretable.
Table 1. List of Clinical and Business IT Categories 
Clinical IT category Business IT category 
Cardiology & PACS Financial decision support 
ED or respiratory General financials 
Electronic medical record Human resources 
Health information management (HIM) Revenue cycle management 
Laboratory Supply chain management 
Nursing Utilization review/risk management 
Pharmacy  
Radiology & PACS  
Table 2. Variable Definitions  
Variable Operationalization 
Dependent variables 
Net patient revenue Total patient revenue 
Uncompensated care ratio Total uncompensated revenue divided by total patient revenue 
Independent variables 
Clinical IT depth (CIT) Number of live and operational clinical IT applications implemented by the hospital 
Business IT depth (BIT) Number of live and operational business IT applications implemented by the hospital 
Control variables 
Church hospital Dummy variable of 1 if the hospital is church owned, 0 otherwise 
Nonprofit hospital Dummy variable of 1 if the hospital is nonprofit, 0 otherwise 
Teaching hospital Dummy variable of 1 if the hospital has medical residents, 0 otherwise 
Hospital size Logarithm of total number of discharges 
% of Medicare patient days Number of Medicare patient days divided by total number of patient days 
% of indigent patient days Number of indigent patient days divided by total number of patient days 
Cost as % of revenue Total cost divided by total patient revenues 
ROA t-1 Return on asset of the previous year 
Industry concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman index: sum of squared market shares per local market 
Case mix index (CMI) Case mix index of the hospital 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min 25% Pctl. Median 75% Pctl. Max 
Dependent variables  
Net patient revenue ($10 
million) 
2,747 52.6916 57.988 0.2929 13.823 34.9495 72.2898 526.0504 
Uncompensated care ratio 3,155 0.023 0.0169 0.0007 0.0107 0.0191 0.0306 0.1002 
Independent variables  
CIT (Normalized) 2,968 0.3193 0.1473 0 0.2 0.3 0.4375 1 
BIT (Normalized) 2,968 0.4024 0.0917 0 0.3556 0.4 0.4444 1 
Control variables               
Church hospital 3,459 0.1159 0.3202 0 0 0 0 1 
Nonprofit hospital 3,459 0.4435 0.4969 0 0 0 1 1 
Teaching hospital 3,459 0.2449 0.43 0 0 0 0 1 
Hospital size 3,390 8.6198 1.2115 4.2485 8.0124 8.8623 9.5535 10.395 
% of Medicare patient days 3,309 0.7535 0.1272 0.3258 0.68 0.7659 0.8438 0.99 
% of indigent patient days 2,726 0.0299 0.0319 0.0003 0.0075 0.0196 0.0429 0.2032 
Cost as % of revenue 3,219 0.3092 0.1295 0.1107 0.2258 0.2726 0.3562 0.8811 
ROA t-1 2,883 0.04 0.1265 -0.4686 -0.0122 0.0408 0.1 0.4859 
Industry concentration 3,432 834.0283 446.554 219.273 534.125 802.898 1165.53 1866.91 
Case mix index (CMI) 3,388 1.1444 0.2726 0.67 0.96 1.1 1.2675 2.65 
Table 4. Correlation Matrix 
  NPR UCR CIT t CIT t-1 CIT t-2 CIT t-3 BIT t BIT t-1 BIT t-2 
Net patient revenue ($10 
million) 
1                 
Uncompensated care ratio -0.3595 1               
CIT t 0.4976 -0.1939 1             
CIT t-1 0.4817 -0.1756 0.8574 1           
CIT t-2 0.4616 -0.1427 0.7521 0.8937 1         
CIT t-3 0.4397 -0.13 0.6641 0.7939 0.8881 1       
BIT t 0.3785 -0.1652 0.6292 0.6114 0.5798 0.5239 1     
BIT t-1 0.3605 -0.1724 0.5752 0.6116 0.5805 0.5518 0.8349 1   
BIT t-2 0.3515 -0.1607 0.542 0.5721 0.5946 0.57 0.7074 0.8334 1 
BIT t-3 0.338 -0.1551 0.5227 0.5274 0.5347 0.5722 0.6144 0.6988 0.8142 
Church hospital 0.0364 -0.1318 -0.0221 -0.0265 -0.0185 -0.0188 0.0056 0.0032 -0.0148 
Nonprofit hospital 0.1659 -0.22 0.168 0.1472 0.1315 0.1273 0.0209 0.0281 0.0476 
Teaching hospital 0.3631 -0.1043 0.1633 0.1369 0.1053 0.0804 0.1491 0.1583 0.1385 
Hospital size 0.6828 -0.3085 0.4787 0.4142 0.3675 0.3423 0.3181 0.319 0.3062 
% of Medicare patient days -0.1455 0.1642 -0.2102 -0.1576 -0.1247 -0.1024 -0.0869 -0.0887 -0.0984 
% of indigent patient days 0.0904 -0.0224 0.0779 0.0798 0.0582 0.041 0.0437 0.0455 0.0286 
Cost as % of revenue -0.3254 0.2247 -0.0911 -0.1079 -0.1155 -0.1202 -0.1303 -0.1302 -0.1367 
Return on asset (ROA) t-1 0.1161 -0.0508 0.1769 0.1674 0.1418 0.1236 0.1512 0.1668 0.168 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) 
0.0364 0.0126 0.0099 0.0098 0.0084 0.0019 0.0198 0.0188 0.0224 
Case mix index (CMI) 0.5366 -0.3441 0.3583 0.3685 0.3689 0.368 0.2381 0.2263 0.214 
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4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
Net patient revenue is measured as total patient 
revenue reported in the OSHPD database. The 
uncompensated care ratio is defined as the percentage 
of uncompensated care compared to total patient 
revenue.  
4.2.3 Control Variables 
We also include a set of hospital and market 
characteristics as control variables for revenue 
management performance. Controls include dummy 
variables that indicate whether a hospital is church-
owned, a teaching hospital, or a nonprofit (vs. for-
profit) hospital. Other hospital-level controls include 
the percentage of Medicare patient days and the 
percentage of indigent patient days. As described in Li 
(2014), in addition to diagnostic-related grouping 
(DRG) weights, the reimbursement amount a hospital 
can receive for a DRG depends on other factors such 
as teaching hospital status and the share of indigent 
patients treated. Church-owned hospitals may be able 
to access additional sources of reimbursement and may 
thus have fewer incentives to implement revenue 
enhancement practices. We control for hospital size by 
including the natural logarithm of the number of 
discharges, as larger hospitals might have greater 
regulatory clout (Carpenter, 2004; Heese, Krishnan, & 
Moers, 2016), and also control for the hospital’s cost 
as a percentage of revenue and return on assets in the 
previous year. We use the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index (HHI) to control for the influence of 
competition, calculating HHI according to the market 
shares of each hospital in the local market (i.e., health 
service area). Finally, we control for the hospital’s case 
mix index (CMI), which captures the average severity 
of illness of patients and controls, to evaluate whether 
a hospital admits more severely ill patients. Table 2 
summarizes all the variables used in this study, which 
were winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. Descriptive 
statistics of all variables are reported in Table 3, and 
Table 4 presents the correlations between all variables. 
4.2.4 Model Estimation 
To test the first four hypotheses, we defined the “short-
term” and “long-term” effects of clinical IT (CIT) and 
business IT (BIT) based on the recommended 
approach (Seetharaman, 2004; Wooldridge, 2015). 
More specifically, as shown in Equation (1), the short-
term effect can be estimated from the coefficients 𝛽1 
and 𝛽2, which are measures of the contemporaneous 
relationship between revenue management and CIT 
and BIT, respectively. In order to test H1 and H3, we 
regressed revenue management performance (i.e., 
revenue𝑖,𝑡 = {log(𝑁𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡) , log(UCR𝑖,𝑡)})
3  at time 𝑡 
based on the contemporaneous effect of CIT and BIT, 
as indicated in the model: 
revenue𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1revenue𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1CIT𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2BIT𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡   , (1) 
where subscript 𝑖  refers to hospital, 𝑡  represents the 
year, CIT𝑡 indicates the clinical IT depth at year 𝑡, BIT𝑡 
indicates the business IT depth at year 𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖,𝑡  are 
control variables for hospital characteristics, and 𝑣𝑖,𝑡 is 
the error term. The fixed effect 𝑢𝑖 measures any time-
invariant heterogeneity at the hospital level and 𝜆𝑡 is 
the year dummies. Then, to test H2 and H4, the long-
term effects can be estimated from the sum of the 
coefficients on the current and lagged CIT, 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 +
𝛽3 + 𝛽4 , (lagged BIT, 𝛽5 + 𝛽6 + 𝛽7 + 𝛽8 ),
4
 which is 
the long-run change in revenue management given a 
permanent increase in CIT (and BIT) and is called the 
long-run propensity (Seetharaman, 2004; Wooldridge, 
2015), in Equation (2). 
revenue𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1revenue𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1CIT𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2CIT𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3CIT𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽4CIT𝑖,𝑡−3 +   𝛽5BIT𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6BIT𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛽7BIT𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽8BIT𝑖,𝑡−3 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 
(2) 
 
It is important to note that to test the short-term and 
long-term effects, we conducted the “t-test” and “F-
test,” respectively. The model represented by Equation 
(3) is used next to estimate the moderating effect of 
hospital size and type on the long-term relationship 
between CIT (and BIT) and revenue management. 
More specifically, the coefficients ( ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑠 = 0  and 
∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑠 = 0 ) of the interaction variables capture the 
moderating effect of hospital size on revenue 
management in Equation (3). Similarly, the 
coefficients (∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑠 = 0  and ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑠 = 0 ) of interaction 
variables capture the moderating effect of hospital type 
(for-profit vs. nonprofit) on revenue management in 
Equation (4). 
 
3 NPR = Net Patient Revenue and UCR = Uncompensated 
Care Ratio. 
4 We chose the lag length using data-dependent methods, 
such as AIC and BIC, rather than arbitrarily selecting the 
number of lags, and the optimal lag order using AIC and BIC 
consistently appears to be 3 in our GMM approach. 
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revenue𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1revenue𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1CIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5BIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+ 𝛽9size𝑖,𝑡 
+       ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1size𝑖,𝑡 × CIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5size𝑖,𝑡 × BIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+    𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡    
(3) 
 
revenue𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼1revenue𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1CIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5BIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+ 𝛽9nonprofit𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1nonprofit𝑖,𝑡 × CIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+ ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5nonprofit𝑖,𝑡 × BIT𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑠=0
+   𝑋𝑖,𝑡𝛾 + 𝑢𝑖
+ 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜐𝑖,𝑡 
(4) 
 
In order to test the moderating effects of hospital size 
and type, we conducted the F-test. Measuring the 
effect of CIT and BIT on hospital-level revenue 
management is likely to be subject to identification 
issues and endogeneity, as is typically the case with 
observational studies (Guide Jr. & Ketokivi, 2015; 
Roberts & Whited, 2012). Unlike in an experimental 
setting where the researcher is able to manipulate the 
treatment conditions, in observational research the 
researcher is merely able to observe the treatment 
conditions (Ketokivi & McIntosh, 2015). Therefore, 
ordinarily, the researcher may not always be able to 
know the exact origins of the variances. A sample of a 
hospital’s increased CIT and BIT is nonrandom, since 
hospitals will only increase IT investment if they 
satisfy specific criteria, and even then, they may decide 
to maintain the status quo. This may lead to an omitted 
variable bias wherein the unobserved, yet satisfied, 
criteria are not being measured and are therefore 
uncontrolled for in the model. Thus, to control for 
endogeneity in this study, we took several specific 
steps.  
First, to account for endogeneity stemming from the 
omitted variable bias, the lagged dependent variable 
was also included as shown in the above equations. 
This approach controls for unobservable omitted 
variables (Dess et al., 1995; Godfrey & Hill, 1995) and 
reflects the possibility that changes in the covariates 
affect the dependent variable over multiple periods 
(Fomby, Hill, & Johnson, 2012; Hitt, Gimeno, & 
Hoskisson, 1998). Furthermore, the inclusion of the 
lagged dependent variable enhances the causal 
inferences that can be drawn (Hitt et al., 1998). Second, 
we use dynamic panel data models and rely on the 
generalized method of moments (GMM) to estimate 
the lagged dependent models (Hansen, 1982). 
Introducing a lagged dependent variable in Equations 
1-4 would ordinarily be biased and inconsistent 
because it would be correlated with the incorrect term. 
Therefore, conventional OLS estimation of the above 
 
5 Especially in the formulations of Arellano and Bond (1991) 
and Arellano and Bond (1995) /Blundell and Bond (1998). 
Both are general estimators designed for situations that have 
few time periods and many individuals.   
dynamic model would produce biased results. To 
mitigate this problem, we used lags of the explanatory 
variables as instruments to achieve consistent 
estimators (Anderson & Hsiao 1981; Anderson & 
Hsiao, 1982). 
GMM estimators for panel data5 have become very 
popular and have attained a leading role among 
dynamic panel data estimators because they produce 
consistent estimates in a dynamic regression model 
with both endogenous explanatory variables and the 
presence of measurement error (Di Liberto, Pigliaru, & 
Mura, 2008). The GMM panel estimator directly 
controls for the potential bias induced by the omission 
of hospital-specific effects and endogeneity. GMM 
also has the advantage of minimizing the loss of 
degrees of freedom when the number of instruments is 
large, relative to the number of observations, which is 
an important feature in the context of this study, given 
that the number of time periods in our dataset is small, 
relative to the number of hospitals.  
However, GMM estimators may suffer from 
instrument proliferation when the number of moments6 
conditions increases because of the dimension of the 
vector of explanatory variables. To resolve this issue, 
we use Roodman’s (2009) recommended approach and 
limit the lag length to adjacent lags (e.g., 𝑡-3 and 𝑡-4) 
in order to reduce the number of counts. To test the 
hypotheses, we do not use all available moment 
conditions because adjacent lags contain more 
informative instruments than very remote lags. In order 
to check the model specification, we conducted a 
second-order autocorrelation test AR(2) and Sargan’s 
overdispersion test. We relied on the Sargan test 
instead of the Hansen test because, while the Sargan 
test is not weakened by the presence of numerous 
instruments, the Hansen test is. The standard 
diagnostic statistics attest to the validity of the 
instrumentation at a 5% significance level (Model 1 in 
Table 5, 𝑝-value = 0.11; Model 2 in Table 5, 𝑝-value = 
6  GMM estimation strategy uses the moment conditions 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠∆𝑣𝑖,𝑡) = 0, where 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 indicates outcome variable 
for 𝑡 = 4, … , 𝑇 and 𝑠 ≥ 2. This is why this strategy is called 
the generalized method of moments (GMM). 
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0.55; Model 3 in Table 5, 𝑝-value = 0.63; Model 4 in 
Table 5, 𝑝-value = 0.31; Model 1 in Table 7, 𝑝-value = 
0.85; Model 2 in Table 7, 𝑝-value = 0.54; Model 1 in 
Table 9, 𝑝-value = 0.58; Model 2 in Table 9, 𝑝-value = 
0.51).  
The Sargan statistic implies that the test of 
overidentifying restrictions cannot reject its null 
hypothesis; the test therefore led us to retain the 
validity of the instruments. As expected, the first order 
is significant based on the Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) because of the lagged dependent variable 
(Arellano & Bond, 1991), thereby rejecting the null 
hypothesis that there is no first-order serial correlation. 
However, in this study, we were unable to reject the 
test for second-order serial correlations of AR(2), 
which thus supports the validity of using lags of 2 and 
longer as GMM instruments (Arellano & Bond, 1991). 
Therefore, these results offer further support for our 
model specification. 
5 Empirical Results 
5.1 Short- and Long-Term Effects of CIT 
and BIT on Net Patient Revenue 
In H1a and H1b, we posit that the short-term effects of 
CIT and BIT are associated with higher net patient 
revenue for the hospital. As shown in Model 1 in Table 
5, the results indicate that CIT and BIT have a positive 
and statistically significant association with net patient 
revenue (𝛽 = 0.093, 𝑝-value < 0.01; 𝛽 = 0.080, 𝑝-
value < 0.05, respectively). In H2a and H2b, we posit 
that the long-term effects of CIT and BIT are associated 
with higher hospital patient revenue. As shown in 
Equations (1) and (2) in Table 6, the results indicate that 
CIT and BIT have a positive and statistically significant 
joint effect with net patient revenue (∑ 𝛽𝑠+1
23
𝑠 = 0 = 0.166, 
p-value = 0.002 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5
23
𝑠 = 0 = 0.163 , p-value =
0.027, respectively). These results suggest CIT and BIT 
have positive and statistically significant short- and long-
term effects on net patient revenue. Thus, we found support 
for H1a, H1b, H2a, and H2b.  
5.2 Short- and Long-Term Effects of CIT 
and BIT on the Uncompensated Care 
Ratio 
In H3a and H3b, we posit that the short-term effects of CIT 
and BIT are associated with a lower uncompensated care 
ratio. As shown in Model 3 in Table 5, the results indicate 
that CIT has a negative and statistically significant 
association with the uncompensated care ratio ( 𝛽 =
−0.279 , 𝑝 -value <  0.05 ). However, there is no 
statistically significant association between BIT and the 
uncompensated care ratio in hospitals (𝛽 = −0.191, p-
value = 0.358). Furthermore, as shown in Equations (3) 
and (4) in Table 6, the results indicate that CIT and BIT 
have a statistically insignificant joint effect on the 
uncompensated care ratio ( ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1
23
𝑠 = 0 = −0.141 , p-
value = 0.236 ;  ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5
23
𝑠 = 0 = −0.100 , p-value =
0.332 , respectively). Thus, we found only a short-term 
effect of CIT on the uncompensated care ratio; H3a is 
supported, but H3b, H4a, and H4b are not supported. 
5.3 Interaction Effect of Hospital Size 
with CIT and BIT on Long-Term 
Revenue Management 
In H5a, we posit that the hospital size moderates the 
relationship between the long-term effects of CIT and 
revenue management (net patient revenue and the 
uncompensated care ratio). As shown in Equations (1) 
and (2) in Table 8, there is no statistically significant 
moderating effect of hospital size on the relationship 
between the long-term effects of CIT and net patient 
revenue (∑ 𝛿𝑠+1
33
𝑠 = 0 = −0.313 ,  𝑝-value= 0.896) as 
well as the uncompensated care ratio (∑ 𝛿𝑠+1
33
𝑠 = 0 =
−0.013 ,  𝑝 -value = 0.480 ). However, as shown in 
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 8, we found that hospital 
size does moderate the relationship between the long-
term effects of BIT and net patient revenue 
(∑ 𝛿𝑠+5
33
𝑠 = 0 = 0.793, 𝑝-value= 0.026) as well as the 
uncompensated care ratio (∑ 𝛿𝑠+5
33
𝑠 = 0 = −1.613, 𝑝-
value < 0.01 ). These results suggest that both the 
positive long-term effects of BIT on net patient 
revenue and the negative long-term effects of BIT on 
the uncompensated care ratio are stronger for larger 
hospitals: i.e., H5a is not supported but H5b is 
supported. 
5.4 Interaction Effect of Hospital Type 
with CIT and BIT on Long-Term 
Revenue Management 
In H6a, we posit that the hospital type moderates the 
relationship between the long-term effects of CIT and 
revenue management (net patient revenue and the 
uncompensated care ratio). As shown in Equations (1) 
and (2) in Table 10, there is a statistically significant 
moderating effect of hospital type on the relationship 
between the long-term effects of CIT and net patient 
revenue (∑ 𝛿𝑠+1
43
𝑠 = 0 = −0.477 ,  𝑝-value= 0.043) as 
well as the uncompensated care ratio (∑ 𝛿𝑠+1
43
𝑠 = 0 =
2.023 ,  𝑝 -value  = 0.027 ). However, as shown in 
Equations (3) and (4) in Table 10, we found that there 
is no moderating effect of hospital type on the 
relationship between the long-term effects of BIT and 
net patient revenue ( ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5
43
𝑠 = 0 = 0.567 ,  𝑝 -value=
0.920 ) as well as the uncompensated care ratio 
(∑ 𝛿𝑠+5
43
𝑠 = 0 = 2.759, 𝑝-value = 0.101). These results 
suggest that the positive long-term effects of CIT on 
net patient revenue as well as the negative long-term 
effects of CIT on the uncompensated care ratio are 
weaker for nonprofit hospitals: i.e., H5a is supported 
but H5b is not supported. 
IT and Hospital Revenue Management 
 
1497 
Table 5. Contemporaneous and Lagging Effects of CIT and BIT on Revenue Management Performance 
 DV = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝐍𝐏𝐑𝐭) DV = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝐔𝐂𝐑𝐭) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Lagged DV 0.620*** (0.015) 0.495*** (0.034) 0.578*** (0.041) 0.644*** (0.053) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕  0.093*** (0.024) 0.113** (0.058) -0.279** (0.139) 0.488 (0.323) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  - -0.033 (0.051) - -0.892*** (0.292) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  - 0.024 (0.026) - 0.588*** (0.165) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  - 0.061** (0.025) - -0.325*** (0.123) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕  0.080** (0.032) 0.209*** (0.067) -0.191 (0.208) -1.244*** (0.337) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  - -0.159*** (0.056) - 1.055*** (0.276) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  - 0.031 (0.027) - -0.169 (0.161) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  - 0.083** (0.035) - 0.259 (0.182) 
Controls Included Included Included Included 
Year dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Hospital FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 265 267 263 254 
N×T 1,874 1,750 1,880 1,762 
Sargan test p-value 0.11 0.55 0.63 0.31 
# of instruments 163 107 117 107 
𝒎𝟏  -3.98*** -4.30*** -6.39*** -6.84*** 
𝒎𝟐  -0.10 -0.83 1.81* 1.41 
Wald test 
𝜒2(24) = 
160,300.87*** 
𝜒2(30) = 
613,761.35*** 
𝜒2(24) = 
1,902.87*** 
𝜒2(24) =
251,965.69*** 
Note: *, **, *** indicates significance level of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively; NPR = net patient revenue; UCR = uncompensated care ratio; 
CIT = clinical IT; BIT = business IT. 
Table 6. Testing H2 and H4: Combined Lagging Effects of CIT and BIT on Revenue Management 
Performance 
Equation 
Estimation 
model in 
Table 5 
Independent 
variable 
𝐇𝟎 𝐇𝐀 
Dependent 
variable 
Test 
statistic 
(𝔃) 
𝒑-value 
(one-sided) 
(1) Model 2  ∑ CIT𝑡−𝑠𝑠 = 0   ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 > 0  log(NPRt)  2.82 0.002 
(2) Model 2 ∑ BIT𝑡−𝑠𝑠 = 0   ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 = 0   ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 > 0  log(NPRt)  1.92 0.027 
(3) Model 4 ∑ CIT𝑡−𝑠𝑠 = 0    ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛽𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 < 0  log(UCRt) -0.72 0.236 
(4) Model 4 ∑ BIT𝑡−𝑠𝑠 = 0   ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛽𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 < 0  log(UCRt) -0.44 0.332 
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Table 7. Moderating Effects of Hospital Size on the Relationships between CIT / BIT and Revenue 
Management Performance 
 DV = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝐍𝐏𝐑𝐭) 
Model 1 
DV = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝐔𝐂𝐑𝐭) 
Model 2 
Lagged DV 0.704*** (0.064) 0.623*** (0.029) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕  1.024** (0.464) 3.231*** (0.715) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  -0.859 (0.607) -2.654*** (0.827) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  1.095* (0.582) -2.061*** (0.587) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  0.0005 (0.371) 1.242*** (0.475) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕  -1.727** (0.742) -0.125 (1.073) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  -0.292 (0.724) 2.576*** (0.841) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  -1.588** (0.673) 1.369** (0.659) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  0.867* (0.471) -0.260 (0.541) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞  0.042 (0.162) 0.682*** (0.162) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕  -0.216 (0.167) -0.847*** (0.282) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  0.247 (0.219) 0.369 (0.333) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  -0.278 (0.231) 1.153*** (0.237) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  -0.065 (0.149) -0.688*** (0.191) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕  0.567** (0.261) -0.391 (0.402) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  -0.061 (0.280) -0.647** (0.208) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  0.613** (0.286) -0.711*** (0.268) 
𝐬𝐢𝐳𝐞 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  -0.326* (0.191) 0.135 (0.207) 
Controls Included Included 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Hospital FE Yes Yes 
N 256 255 
N×T 1,750 1,723 
Sargan test p-value 0.85 0.54 
# of instruments 84 163 
𝒎𝟏  -3.45*** -7.41*** 
𝒎𝟐  1.30 1.35 
Wald test 𝜒2(38) = 8,521.55*** 𝜒2(38) = 398,086.16*** 
Table 8. Testing H5: Moderating Effects of Hospital Size on the Relationships between CIT / BIT and 
Revenue Management Performance 
Equation 
Estimation 
model in 
Table 7 
Independent 
variable 
𝐇𝟎 𝐇𝐀 
Dependent 
variable 
Test 
statistic 
(𝔃) 
𝒑-value 
(one-
sided) 
(1) Model 1 ∑ size × CIT𝑡−𝑠𝑖 = 0   ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 > 0  log(NPRt) -1.25 0.896 
(2) Model 2 ∑ size × CIT𝑡−𝑠𝑖 = 0    ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 < 0  log(UCRt) -0.05 0.480 
(3) Model 1 ∑ size × BIT𝑡−𝑠𝑖 = 0    ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 > 0  log(NPRt)   1.95 0.026 
(4) Model 2 ∑ size × BIT𝑡−𝑠𝑖 = 0    ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 < 0  log(UCRt) -3.37 < 0.001 
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Table 9. Moderating Effects of Hospital Type (Nonprofit vs. For-profit) on the Relationships between CIT / 
BIT and Revenue Management Performance 
 
DV = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝐍𝐏𝐑𝐭) 
Model 1 
DV = 𝐥𝐨𝐠(𝐔𝐂𝐑𝐭) 
Model 2 
Lagged DV 0.562*** (0.061) 0.691*** (0.096) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕  0.570*** (0.208) 1.779 (1.114) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  -0.201 (0.223) -3.431** (1.374) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  -0.120 (0.195) 1.051 (1.271) 
𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  0.133 (0.193) -1.259 (0.964) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕  -0.530 (0.329) -4.307** (1.996) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  -0.192 (0.186) 2.460** (1.185) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  -0.088 (0.208) -0.027 (1.681) 
𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  0.231 (0.185) 0.693 (1.467) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭  -0.050 (0.131) -1.849** (0.742) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕   -0.632*** (0.251) -1.244 (1.213) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  0.103 (0.251) 2.717* (1.535) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  0.214 (0.238) 0.294 (1.431) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐂𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  -0.162 (0.234) 0.256 (1.126) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕  0.686** (0.341) 4.227** (1.700) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟏  -0.195 (0.282) -0.848 (1.628) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟐  0.154 (0.295) 1.459 (1.804) 
𝐧𝐨𝐧𝐩𝐫𝐨𝐟𝐢𝐭 × 𝐁𝐈𝐓𝒕−𝟑  -0.077 (0.242) -2.079 (1.389) 
Controls Included Included 
Year dummy Yes Yes 
Hospital FE Yes Yes 
N 256 255 
N×T 1,750 1,723 
Sargan test p-value 0.85 0.54 
# of instruments 79 79 
𝒎𝟏  -3.09*** -3.51*** 
𝒎𝟐  -0.77 0.73 
Wald test 𝜒2(38) = 29,524.96*** 𝜒2(38) = 745.92*** 
Table 10. Testing H6: Moderating Effects of Hospital Type (Nonprofit vs. For-profit) on the Relationships 
between CIT / BIT and Revenue Management Performance 
Equation 
Estimation 
model in 
Table 9 
Independent 
variable 
𝐇𝟎 𝐇𝐀 
Dependent 
variable 
Test 
statistic 
(𝔃) 
𝒑-
value 
(one-
sided) 
(1) Model 1  
∑ nonprofit ×𝑖 = 0
CIT𝑡−𝑠  
∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆=0 < 0  log(NPRt) -1.71 0.043 
(2) Model 2 
∑ nonprofit ×𝑖 = 0
CIT𝑡−𝑠   
∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+1𝑆=0 > 0  log(UCRt) 1.92 0.027 
(3) Model 1 
∑ nonprofit ×𝑖 = 0
BIT𝑡−𝑠   
∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆=0 < 0  log(NPRt) 1.40 0.920 
(4) Model 2 
∑ nonprofit ×𝑖 = 0
BIT𝑡−𝑠   
∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆 = 0 = 0  ∑ 𝛿𝑠+5𝑆=0 > 0  log(UCRt) 1.28 0.101 
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Table 11. Summary of Hypotheses Test Results 
Hypothesis statement Independent variable 
Dependent 
variable 
Results Table # 
Model / 
Equation # 
H1a: CIT has positive short-term effects on 
net patient revenue.  
CIT𝑡 NPR Supported 5 (1) 
H1b: BIT has positive short-term effects on 
net patient revenue.  
BIT𝑡 NPR Supported 5 (1) 
H2a: CIT has positive long-term effects on 
net patient revenue.  
∑ CIT𝑡−𝑠
𝑠 = 0
 NPR Supported 6 (1) 
H2b: BIT have positive long-term effects 
on net patient revenue.  
∑ BIT𝑡−𝑠
𝑠 = 0
 
NPR Supported 6 (2) 
H3a: CIT has negative short-term effects on 
the uncompensated care ratio. 
CIT𝑡 UCR Supported 5 (3) 
H3b: BIT has negative short-term effects on 
the uncompensated care ratio. 
BIT𝑡 UCR Not 
supported 
5 (3) 
H4a: CIT has negative long-term effects on 
the uncompensated care ratio. 
∑ CIT𝑡−𝑠
𝑠 = 0
 UCR Not 
supported 
6 (3) 
H4b: BIT has negative long-term effects on 
the uncompensated care ratio. 
∑ BIT𝑡−𝑠
𝑠 = 0
 UCR Not 
supported 
6 (4) 
H5a: Hospital size interacts with CIT to 
predict long-term revenue management 
performance such that the positive long-
term effects of CIT on net patient revenue 
and the negative long-term effects of CIT on 
the uncompensated care ratio are stronger 
for larger hospitals 
∑ size × CIT𝑡−𝑠
𝑖 = 0
 NPR & 
UCR 
 
Not 
supported 
 
8 (1) & (2) 
H5b: Hospital size interacts with BIT to 
predict long-term revenue management 
performance such that the positive long-
term effects of BIT on net patient revenue 
and the negative long-term effects of BIT on 
uncompensated care ratio are stronger for 
larger hospitals 
∑ size × BIT𝑡−𝑠
𝑖 = 0
 NPR & 
UCR 
 
Supported 
 
8 (3) & (4) 
H6a: Hospital type (profit vs. nonprofit) 
interacts with CIT to predict revenue 
management performance such that the 
positive long-term effects of CIT on net 
patient revenue and the negative long-term 
effects of CIT on uncompensated care ratio 
are weaker for nonprofit hospitals 
∑ nonprofit
𝑖 = 0
× CIT𝑡−𝑠 
NPR & 
UCR 
 
Supported 
 
10 (1) & (2) 
H6b: Hospital type (profit vs. nonprofit) 
interacts with BIT to predict revenue 
management performance such that the 
positive long-term effects of BIT on net 
patient revenue and the negative long-term 
effects of BIT on uncompensated care ratio 
are weaker for nonprofit hospitals 
∑ nonprofit
𝑖 = 0
× BIT𝑡−𝑠 
NPR & 
UCR 
 
Not 
supported 
 
10 (3) & (4) 
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6 Discussion   
Hospitals in the US and other countries seek to balance 
not only financial objectives, such as providing returns 
on assets to owners (in the case of for-profit hospitals) 
and cost efficiency, but also provide social returns in 
the form of charity care and medical education. 
Donations and subsidies may cover some of the cost of 
meeting social obligations, but for most hospitals, 
these extra resources are inadequate to cover the cost 
of providing such services. IT can improve hospital 
performance by allowing the hospital to identify 
mechanisms to enhance their revenues. These 
mechanisms include collecting a higher percentage of 
patient revenues and improving management of the 
revenue cycle, which can thereby reduce 
uncompensated care costs. In this paper, we make 
theoretical arguments and propose hypotheses on the 
effects of IT investment on revenue management 
performance and empirically test our hypotheses using 
various proprietary data sources, finding supportive 
results.  
Our empirical analyses generally support our 
hypotheses regarding the effect of IT investment on 
revenue management performance. We find strong 
support for the hypotheses regarding the effect of IT 
investment on revenue enhancement and partial 
support for the hypotheses regarding the 
uncompensated care ratio. The impact of both clinical 
and business IT investment on revenue generation is 
strong and has long-term impacts, implying that IT 
investment does pay off over the long run. Another 
important finding regards the learning process that 
hospitals undergo following the implementation of IT 
systems. As suggested by many previous IS studies, 
organizations experience a period of learning and 
adaptation that is necessary before they can take 
complete advantage of the newly implemented systems 
and realize their expected value.  
Also, we found that hospital size can be a vital factor 
in determining how to maximize the efficacy of IT 
investments. Our findings suggest that larger hospitals 
are better at utilizing new technologies to facilitate 
revenue management through both expanding revenue 
sources and managing sunk costs associated with 
uncompensated care. We argue that larger hospitals 
typically possess more and better medical, human, and 
administration resources, which have greater 
complementarities with IT investments and contribute 
to the positive synergistic effects identified between IT 
investments and hospital size.  
It is also worth noting that we only found this 
moderation effect in relation to business IT 
investments. We argue that this effect is due to the 
nature of technology. Larger hospitals typically have 
larger administrative teams as well as more guidelines 
and management oversight, which better facilitate the 
organizational adaptation necessary to complement IT 
investment. However, larger hospitals also tend to 
have more experienced and established medical 
providers, who may be more likely to insist on 
retaining the status quo and less likely to agree to the 
changes necessary to accommodate new IT systems. 
Therefore, while there may be positive interaction 
effects between hospital size and clinical IT 
investment, such effects may be offset by negative 
effects associated with the reluctance to make changes 
to adapt to the new technologies on the part of the 
highly skilled and reputable medical staff likely to be 
employed by larger hospitals. 
Finally, our findings indicate that different types of 
hospitals do not benefit equally from IT investments. 
Different institutional backgrounds and service 
missions are associated with different revenue models, 
which, in turn, impacts hospitals’ incentives for 
participating in revenue management strategies and 
implementing new IT investments for such purposes. 
Therefore, nonprofit hospitals may not be as motivated 
as for-profit hospitals to successfully implement the 
necessary organizational changes to complement IT 
investments. Indeed, we found that clinical IT 
investments benefit for-profit hospitals more than their 
nonprofit counterparts. The fact that the interaction 
effect regarding hospital type is present only for 
clinical IT systems supports our argument regarding 
organizational learning and adaptation. Since clinical 
IT systems are more complex and require more process 
reengineering, medical providers working at nonprofit 
hospitals may be more reluctant to make changes in 
their practices to accommodate the new systems. 
However, given that business IT systems are highly 
standardized and less dynamic in nature, they thus 
require less organizational adaptation than clinical 
systems. The above arguments suggesting that 
healthcare providers may be reluctant to make the 
changes necessary to accommodate IT adoptions not 
only makes intuitive sense but is also supported by a 
recent study showing that physicians engage in 
accelerated retirement or job changes to a greater 
extent when they experience routine disruptions 
caused by new technology implementations and the 
associated organizational pressure to adapt to them 
(Greenwood, Ganju, & Angst, 2019). 
This study contributes to the IS and management 
literatures in many ways. First, it sheds new light on 
the role of IT for organizational performance, 
specifically in the healthcare industry. While previous 
studies have focused on performance measures related 
mainly to cost or efficiency concerns and healthcare 
quality, this study examines the important yet 
understudied metric of revenue management. Since 
effective revenue management is essential for hospital 
performance, the context of this study is highly 
relevant for practice as well as theory. Second, this is 
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the first study that differentiates clinical from business 
IT and investigates their differential effects on hospital 
performance. Third, this study confirms the findings of 
previous literature regarding the complementarities 
between technology adoption and organizational 
adaptations and provides another piece of empirical 
evidence demonstrating that organizations need to 
reengineer their processes and make ample supporting 
resources available in order to successfully implement 
new technologies. There is a learning curve that 
hospitals must overcome before they can fully 
assimilate an IT adoption and leverage it to create 
value in terms of revenue enhancement. Finally, our 
findings regarding the heterogeneous effects of IT 
across hospital types and sizes are unique and provide 
evidence that organizations must all be treated 
differently and may benefit from IT adoption in 
different ways and to different degrees. 
Our study also provides several managerial 
implications for healthcare administrators and hospital 
decision makers. First, although IT generally improves 
hospitals’ revenue management practices, 
administrators should be aware that IT investment may 
not pay off immediately. Especially for those 
implementations involving complex clinical 
applications that require learning and experience, it 
may take years for them to start creating measurable 
value; thus, management teams, board members, 
medical providers, and administrative personnel 
should be encouraged to exercise patience and 
tolerance regarding early struggles and complications 
involving IT implementations. Finally, managers 
should recognize that IT implementations may not 
deliver the same value for all hospitals. Indeed, our 
findings indicate that IT implementations will yield the 
most benefit for larger and for-profit hospitals.  
7 Limitations and Future Research 
We acknowledge two limitations of our study, which, 
however, offer avenues for further research. First, the 
use of observational data is inevitably susceptible to 
endogeneity—particularly endogeneity caused by 
reverse causality and omitted-varible bias—which 
makes it difficult for researchers to draw causal 
inferences. In the context of this study, although we 
argue that IT investments lead to higher net patient 
revenue for hospitals, it could also be argued that a 
hospital is more likely to invest in IT when expected 
revenues are high, which would indicate a reverse- 
causality problem. To mitigate reverse causality, in 
this study, we used the GMM approach, which is a 
panel regression estimator that specifically aims to 
prevent bias based on reverse causality. The GMM 
estimator was developed by Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and is an extension of the dynamic panel data 
regression proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991).  
Second, this study demonstrates the positive, long-
term, combined effect of CIT (and BIT) on net patient 
revenue. However, we do not illuminate the specific 
mechanisms used by hospitals to achieve such positive 
long-term outcomes. This study does not focus on the 
serial changes in the effect of CIT (and BIT) on net 
patient revenue. We encourage future research to 
investigate the specific organizational mechanisms 
allowing hospitals to realize positive revenue changes. 
Moreover, our study only covers ten years of data, 
which may not be enough for a time series (not panel 
data) analysis. For example, in the unit root test for 
stationarity over time, there are only 30 data points; as 
such, a potentially low statistical power may be 
expected. Thus, we encourage future research to use 
quarterly based data to investigate the effects of such 
mechanisms. 
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